Reverse tax lotteries — taxes where a basic parameter (the amount, the taxpayer) is chosen randomly — are an interesting concept which may have a wealth of applications. Maybe there’s a series coming here.
Today’s instalment is about using taxes as a regulatory device to control for financial concentration and increase risk awareness and management among market players.
Financial products are not aircrafts
One problem with the mainline approach to financial regulation is that it’s aimed at trying to find fragile features of the financial system, and then regulate around the fragility to make it impossible to happen. This is basically the aircraft industry’s approach to safety. This may not be such a good idea in finance because financial failure are as such not as catastrophic as a plane crash. Finance is about bookkeeping units of future resource allocation power, where failure causes more subtle problems — sometimes not even system-level negative — than a plane crash. Secondly in finance players are often trying to work around the safety procedures instead of consenting to the safety imperative as pilots and maintenance technicians generally do.
What best to teach people to cope with failure than having it happen frequently enough for it to become a manageable habit? Incandescent light bulbs fail frequently, so cars have two headlights, so they can keep operating at night should the predictable failure of one light bulb occur. The statistical chance of both lights failing is small enough, that one can take the small residual risk of having a complete failure between the failure of one lamp and its replacement.
In finance the solution to such issues is diversification. If one’s savings are split between 100 issuers, the failure of one of them is a non-event. Unfortunately, some classes of financial instruments, e.g. the quality end of fixed income, fail so rarely that people often forget they can fail, which in itself is a contributory factor to them failing en masse during systemic crisis.
So, a way to remind people of that failure risk is to have forced bankruptcies: have the regulator pick some random issuers every so often, and simulate a bankruptcy, by taking all their assets and closing them down. Applied to equity for instance, this could be done by expropriating current shareholders of the randomly chosen company, and redistributing new shares via an IPO whose proceeds are tax revenue.
It’s a nice way to add some tax revenue as well, which could substitute some of the existing non-probabilistic taxation, of fund new public goods as desired. Alternatively this can be do in a tax neutral way, by redistributing the proceeds of the levy to the remaining players.
This tax could be applied to all asset classes, e.g. just pick 1% of all available financial products every year and fail them. For risky investments with an intrinsically high failure rate it will just be barely noticeable noise, and it spares the regulator the arduous and hazardous task of having to classify instruments.
In addition to reminding people of bankruptcy risk, by effectively introducing a floor to the level of total loss risk, it is a strong disincentive against having large single points of failure as nobody will want to put too much in any single basket.
Some potential problems with the measure I can think of: this can’t be applied to brokerage-level institutions unless end consumers of financial service are required to diversify brokerages or bank accounts — although maybe that is desirable! Exempt brokerages could help my making it easy to split savings or investement into diversified portfolios (e.g. replacing single-point of failure ETFs with auto-rebalanced direct holdings of the underlyings).
It does not remove the risk of systemic misinvestment into asset classes represented by many instruments, e.g. if wouldn’t prevent sector bubbles. Still the higher background level of failure may have a slight moderating effect on the psychology of exuberance.
As with any new tax, the argument would be made in any jurisdiction introducing it first that all the money would leave. I see no reason why it should be the case at a reasonable level, the tax load is not in essence that different from say stamp duty style taxes. Indeed in the UK it could replace stamp duty and be levied at the same rate of 0.5% (but here of instruments’ market cap rather than trading volumes).