Much has already been said about the Greek “deal”, most of it unsurprisingly negative. No question it’s a sorry deal in many ways, but I’ll skip that today and try to cover some of the positives.
The Eurozone’s future is now on the table
It has been long known that the euro can be seen as two very different projects: one is a building block on the way to some kind of Federal Europe, the other is a purely technical shared currency, which is doomed to be a form of synthetic gold, because the strength of such a currency is the binding factor — otherwise the stronger members will leave.
Deciding where to go has been procrastinated since 1999 and absent any crises looked like it would be forever. But this crisis has put the debate back on the table. It could still simmer for a while, but I think the debate has advanced more in the past few months than in the last decade.
The historical track record of loose currency unions is abysmal, so if federalism doesn’t progress, we’re probably in for an implosion, if possibly a slow one. I would still bet on (some form of) federalism winning the day in due course.
The Greek debt sustainability debate is over
Today’s Draghi comment that a Greek debt write-off or some kind or other is “not controversial” reflects the speed at which the official consensus has changed. It’s striking that everybody, from the IMF to Schäuble, now agrees on that, despite being a total taboo at least in official speech a few short months ago. Varoufakis has at least comprehensively won the argument here, if not yet a solution.
Defaulting on the IMF was very useful
The catalyst for the above may have been the default on the IMF. Funny how now that the option is full default or a write off by other official creditors, the latter has become their top priority.
Also the silly long term GDP extrapolation modelling methodology has flipped to Greece’s advantage. Now they extrapolate 2 weeks of capital controls to an exhaustive disaster for the next umpteen years.
As such I don’t think a few weeks of capital controls are that bad. No actual production capacity is destroyed, people can go back to work doing whatever they were doing before when it’s over. It could push a few marginal businesses to bankruptcy but I don’t think you can project much out of that. Out-of-model factors will surely have an order of magnitude greater influence on the final outcome. The good thing is IMF models will now probably tend to underestimate Greek recovery, pushing for a better (than otherwise would be) deal.
The deal is technically pretty open
The deal is actually quite open. Everybody seems to expect Greece to get smashed, and it could, but if the politics follow it’s also possible for the deal to produce a reasonable outcome, e.g. the open-end negotiation on debt rescheduling going somewhere decent.
The deal does buy time
As a 3-year deal, if it doesn’t fall on some technical hurdle or outright sabotage, it does leave time for European politics to mature. It would get a bit easier if Tsipras’ Greece wasn’t the only unorthodox (in being of a Keyneysian and somewhat federalist inclination) government in power. In a positive scenario you could imagine both a shift in PIGS and greater tolerance in the Northern countries. It is still pretend and extend, but if we can pretend and extend until the next treaty, and that’s in 2 rather than 20 years, good.
Here and in its open-ended character, it is better than the “referendum question” deal.
Merkel has still not spent any political capital on this
Merkel’s approval rating hasn’t been dented at all and she has effectively not used any of her large stock of political capital, indeed may have again increased it. That can be seen negatively — reward for being tough — but also positively — the “kick the Greeks out of the Euro” constituency may be losing out in Germany.
It also means she’s got capital left for an actual compromise and or federalist steps. Not a given she will use it, but the outlook could be worse.
Benefits of capital controls
As a parting shot I’ve noticed a few positive side effects of capital controls:
- people with some savings allegedly accelerated paying off debts or taxes, as a bail-in risk mitigation, thereby improving the position of the state and banks, contributing to offsetting some of the negative impact
- nearly everybody in Greece now has an ATM card (some bank branches were open for that issuing cards) and greater access to online banking
- it shows how an emergency (semi-)exit could work in a currency union: keep the union currency for paper cash, and use trapped banking currency as a new digital-only currency, by just replacing the exit/ATM limits with an auction system, aka a forex rate between the trapped digital deposits and the union currency